Dual-Use AI Capabilities and the Risk of Bioterrorism
Converting Capability Evaluations to Risk Assessments
Several frontier AI companies test their AI systems for dual-use biological capabilities that might be misused by threat actors. But what do these test results imply about the overall risk of bioterrorist attacks? There is much expert debate about how seriously to view such threats, especially from lone wolf actors.
This report creates a framework for how to convert capability evaluations into risk assessments, using a simple model that draws on historical case studies, expert elicitation, and reference class forecasting. I conclude that if AI systems were to increase the number of STEM Bachelors able to synthesise pathogens as complex as influenza by 10 percentage points and also enable them to design concerning operational attack plans, then the annual probability of an epidemic caused by a lone wolf attack might increase from 0.15% to 1.0%. This is equivalent to 12,000 additional expected deaths per year, or ~$100B. Risk scenarios where AI or other tools also help discover novel viruses reach higher damages, whereas risk can also be significantly lowered if mitigations are put in place.
A review of this report by six subject-matter experts and five superforecasters found similar medians, though all forecasts had high uncertainty. This work demonstrates a methodological approach for converting capability evaluations into risk assessments, whilst highlighting the continued need for better underlying evidence and expert discussion to refine assumptions.
